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Abstract
This paper explores the labor supply effects of a large-scale policy change in
the Austrian disability insurance program, which tightened eligibility crite-
ria for men above a certain age. Using administrative data on the universe
of Austrian private-sector employees, the results of difference-in-difference
type regressions suggest a substantial and statistically significant decline
in disability enrollment of 5-5.7 percentage points and a modest increase
in employment of 1.4 to 2.7 percentage points. On the other hand, the
policy change had important spillover effects into the unemployment and
sickness insurance program. Specifically, the share of individuals receiving
unemployment benefits increased roughly by 3 percentage points and the
share receiving sickness insurance benefits by 0.6 percentage points.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1960s the labor force participation rate of males aged 55-64 in the
OECD countries has decreased from 80 to 65 percent, despite considerable im-
provements in aggregate health. The negative effects of this trend on economic
growth and public expenditure are exacerbated by falling fertility rates and a
significant increase in the average life expectancy.1 Hence, reversing the decline
in labor supply of older people is a main policy priority.
The existing literature has shown that the public pension system creates
strong incentives for early retirement (Gruber and Wise (1998) and Blöndal and
Scarpetta (1999)), which are strongly correlated with the retirement behavior of
older workers (Burtless (1986), Krueger and Pischke (1992), Samwick (1998), and
Coile and Gruber (2007)). In particular, the change in the present discounted
value of future pension benefits from delaying retirement by one year is negative,
thereby discouraging continuation in the labor force. While old age pension in-
centives are an important factor in retirement behavior, in many countries the
disability insurance (DI) program has become a further pathway to early retire-
ment even before the early retirement age. Therefore, to effectively encourage
labor force participation of older workers, reforms in the disability insurance pro-
gram are needed.
This paper exploits a policy change in the eligibility criteria for DI benefits
in Austria to examine how stricter disability screening of older workers close to
retirement age affects their labor supply behavior. Modeled after Austria’s leg-
islation for the self-employed, since 1981 conditions to obtain disability benefits
have been substantially relaxed for older private sector workers starting at age
55. Specifically, below the age threshold an individual is generally considered
disabled if a medically determinable impairment reduces the ability to work by
1Over the past 50 years the total fertility rate has fallen from 3.2 to 1.8 children per women
and the average life expectancy has increased by 10 years (OECD (2006)).
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more than 50% relative to a healthy person with comparable education in any
reasonable occupation that the individual can carry out. According to the law, an
occupation is “reasonable” if it does not entail a loss of social status and there ex-
ist at least 100 jobs in the field (vacant or occupied) in Austria (Wörister (1999)).
Above the age-threshold of 55 the same individual qualifies for disability benefits
if the ability to work is reduce by more than 50% relative to a healthy person
with comparable education in a similar occupation. An occupation is considered
similar if manual and mental demands, amount of responsibility, posture, con-
centration, endurance, required care, and stress level are comparable (Wörister
(1999)).
Thus, as older workers are only compared to the set of workers in their occu-
pation and given the generosity of DI benefits (the maximum monthly pension
is more than $ 3200), disability enrollment accelerates dramatically beginning at
age 55. Because the eligibility age for early retirement benefits is 60 for men com-
pared to 55 for women, disability enrollment is disproportionately high among
older men. With the aim of improving the fiscal health of the public pension sys-
tem, the Austrian government implemented the Structural Adjustment Act on
September 1, 1996, which restricted eligibility for early retirement benefits and
introduced a bonus/malus system to penalize early retirement and encourage
continued labor force participation. The most important change of all, however,
was a two-year increase in the age, at which conditions for DI benefits are re-
laxed. Because DI enrollment has been particularly high among older men, this
increase took effect only for men, while eligibility conditions for women were left
unaffected.
The present study relies on a difference-in-difference estimation strategy, to
examine the causal impact of the Structural Adjustment Act (SAA) on the labor
supply of older workers. The first objective of this paper is to determine how
the more restrictive eligibility criteria for DI benefits affected employment and
enrollment into the DI program. A second key question is whether the stricter
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disability screening standards led to an increase in enrollment in the unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance program (SI).2 Accounting for such
spillover effects is potentially important for designing effective policies. In the
present context, for example, the positive employment effect of stricter DI eligi-
bility is likely to be small, if individuals claim UI or SI benefits instead.
The data comes from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which
covers the universe of private sector workers and has two attractive features.
First, even when very specific control groups are considered, sample sizes are
large and effects can be estimated with a high degree of precision. Second, the
data records all employment, unemployment, sick leave, disability and retirement
spells back to 1972, which permits to trace individuals over time and reconstruct
an individual’s entire labor market history.
The results from the empirical analysis suggest that enrollment in the dis-
ability insurance program responded significantly to the tightening of the eligi-
bility criteria. Following the change in law, the share of individuals in the treat-
ment group receiving disability benefits decreased permanently by 5.5 percentage
points. The drop in disability enrollment is countered by significant spillover ef-
fects into the UI and SI program. Specifically, the estimates suggest that the SAA
led to an increase in unemployment and sick leave of 3 and 0.6 percentage points,
respectively. On the other hand, employment increased by approximately 2 per-
centage points, after the change in law became operative. Even in the absence of
spillover effects, however, the SAA is unlikely to have generated larger employ-
ment effects, given the large fraction of disability applicants that are unemployed
or receive sick leave benefits before claiming disability benefits. Because health
eligibility criteria for disability benefits below the age threshold are more relaxed
for white collar workers compared to blue collar workers, the change in eligibility
2Spillover effects between government programs haven been examined in other contexts by
Garrett and Glied (2000), Schmidt and Sevak (2004), Bound et al. (2004), and Duggan et al.
(2007).
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criteria was more drastic for the latter group. Indeed, contrasting the labor force
behavior of these two subgroups suggests that the decline in disability enrollment
is disproportionately large among blue collar workers.
There is a substantial literature addressing the behavioral effects of disability
insurance programs.3 While several papers have estimated the elasticity of labor
force participation with respect to generosity of benefits (see Parsons (1980),
Bound (1989), Haveman et al. (1991) and Gruber (2000)), in this study the level of
benefits remains largely constant over the sample period and what changes is the
access to disability benefits. Therefore, the parameter of interest is the elasticity
of labor force participation with respect to the stringency of the screening process
of applicants to the disability insurance program.
This parameter has been estimated for the US by Gruber and Kubik (1997)
and Autor and Duggan (2003). Gruber and Kubik (1997) study the impact of
the increase in rejection rates for the DI program in the 1970s on the labor force
participation of older males using variation in denial rates across states. Their
main results suggests that a 10% rise in denial rates lead to 2.8% reduction in
labor force non-participation among 45-64 year old males. Autor and Duggan
(2003) use the liberalization of the disability determination process in 1984 and
an unforseen increase in the earnings replacement rate to explore the impact of
the supply of disability benefits on the labor force participation of low-skilled
workers.
One problem faced by these papers is that all workers face identical program
rules, making it difficult to find a suitable counterfactual. This paper circum-
vents this problem by exploiting a change in law that had a large effect on one
group of workers while leaving nearly identical individuals completely unaffected.
Moreover, since the data contains information on the entire labor market history,
this paper can examine how changes in eligibility rules of one program affect
3For an excellent overview of the literature see Bound and Burkhauser (1999) and Autor
and Duggan (2006).
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enrollment into other government programs.
The papers most closely related to the present study are by De Jong et al.
(2009) for the Netherlands and Karlström et al. (2008) for Sweden. De Jong
et al. (2009) use a controlled experiment to examine the effects of stricter dis-
ability screening. Specifically, in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers were
instructed to screen applicants more intensively. Contrary to this paper, they
find no evidence that stricter disability screening increases the inflow into the
unemployment insurance program, even for workers aged 55 and older, who may
express particular problems in finding a job. Moreover, they find that long-term
absenteeism due to sickness decreases with intensified screening, while in the
present paper inflow into the SI program increases after the stricter eligibility
rules become effective.
Karlström et al. (2008) examine the labor supply effects of a policy change
in Sweden that abolished relaxed eligibility rules for governing disability benefits
for workers aged 60 and above. As a result of the reform studied by Karlström
et al. (2008) having been announced 2 years prior to its implementation, there
are large anticipation effects, which could potentially cause an upward bias in the
estimates. In contrast, the time span between announcement and implementation
of the reform examined in this paper is only a few months. While Karlström et al.
(2008) also find large inflows into the UI and SI program, they find no effect on
employment. In contrast, this paper finds that the SAA led to the intended
increase in employment, mainly by reducing the direct exits from employment
into disability.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the key features of the
Austrian disability insurance program. Section 3 describes the policy change
and derives the theoretical predictions that are tested in the data. Section 4
outlines the identification strategy. Section 5 summarizes the data and presents
descriptive statistics. Section 6 presents the results. Finally, section 7 draws
conclusions.
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2 The Austrian Disability Insurance Program
Austria’s DI program covers all active labor market participants, although dif-
ferent rules apply for the self-employed and civil servants. It is one of the largest
social security programs in Austria and accounts for 10 percent of all social ex-
penditures, which is equivalent to 2.5 percent of GDP (Börsch-Supan (2007)).
DI benefits, which depend on the recipient’s prior earnings and labor market his-
tory, are extremely generous. The average gross replacement rate is 80 percent,
compared to 59 percent for the OECD countries (OECD (2007)).
Once benefits are awarded, DI beneficiaries receive monthly payments until
medical recovery, death or retirement, at which point they obtain equivalent
benefits from the Public Old Age Pension program. Moreover, the DI program
offers vocational rehabilitation that aims to restore or improve the work capacity
of the insured. The selection process for vocational rehabilitation depends on
the age of the recipients. For every 100 disability beneficiaries, there are 170
individuals within the age group 20-34 who undergo vocational rehabilitation,
but only four in the age group 45-59 (OECD (2003)).
Given the generosity of DI benefits and because criteria for disability classifi-
cation are relaxed for the elderly, the DI program has played an important role
in early retirement. In the 1990s an average of 35 per 1000 people in the age
group 55-59 claimed DI benefits, which is twice the average across the OECD
countries and fifteen times higher than the average of age group 35-44 (OECD
(2005)). Since Austria’s early retirement age is 60 for men compared to 55 for
women, disability enrollment is disproportionately high among older men. In the
age group 55-59 the disability inflow rate is typically five times higher for men
than for women (OECD (2003)).
As a result of the large share of DI recipients between the ages 55 and 59,
disabilities common to the elderly (such as musculoskeletal disorders, or back
pain) account for most of the new disability awards, while – in a difference from
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most other countries – mental disorders are relatively unimportant. For example,
musculoskeletal disorders make up 43 percent of all awards in 1995, followed
by cardiovascular disease with 14 percent and mental disorders with 13 percent
(Wörister (1999)).
2.1 Eligibility Criteria and Calculation of Benefits
To be eligible for DI benefits, applicants must suffer a health impairment that
will last for at least six months and must have, depending on age, accumulated
between 5 and 15 insurance years. Insurance years comprise both contributing
years (periods of employment, including sick leave, and maternity leave) and
qualifying years (periods of unemployment, military service, or secondary edu-
cation). In a difference from the US system, applicants currently in the labor
force are eligible for DI benefits (see Autor and Duggan (2003)), although once
benefits are awarded, earnings may not exceed a certain threshold. The rejec-
tion rate – the fraction of applicants rejected benefits – is close to 50 percent
and among those who reapply around 15 percent are awarded benefits (OECD
(2003)). Labor market conditions play no direct role in the award decision. But
the economic environment has an indirect effect, given that during an economic
downturn more people apply for disability benefits.
The calculation of DI benefits is identical to that of retirement benefits and
depends on two factors, the assessment basis and the pension coefficient:
DIa,t =
(pension coefficient)a,t
100
∗ (assesment basis)t (1)
where DIa,t is the yearly disability pension for an individual of age a becoming
disabled at time t. The assessment basis is determined by the average earnings
of the best 15 years, after applying an earnings cap to earnings in each year.4 To
account for wage inflation, the capped earnings in each year are re-valued based on
4Prior to 1993, the assessment basis was equal to average earnings in the most recent 15
years.
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wage adjustment factors. The pension coefficient corresponds to the percentage
of the assessment basis that is received in the disability pension. It increases with
the number accumulated contribution years. Specifically, when an individual has
accumulated fewer than 30 contribution years, each contribution year replaces
1.9 percent of the assessment. When the number of accumulated contribution
years is above 30, each contribution year below 30 replaces 1.9 percent and each
contribution year above 30 replaces 1.5 percent of the assessment basis.5 The
maximum pension is 80 percent of the assessment basis (around 45 contributing
years), but cannot exceed an amount of approximately $ 3200 per month.
Health eligibility criteria for DI benefits depend on age and whether the ap-
plicant is classified as a blue or white collar worker. Blue collar workers below
age 55 are eligible for benefits if a medically determinable impairment causes
more than 50 percent of a reduction in the ability to work relative to that of a
healthy person with comparable education in any reasonable occupation that the
individual can carry out. According to the law, an occupation is “reasonable” if it
does not entail a loss of social status and there exist at least 100 jobs in the field
(vacant or occupied) in Austria (Wörister (1999)), i.e. individuals are expected
to be completely flexible as to changes in residence. Eligibility criteria for ben-
efits are relaxed for white collar workers below age 55 because requirements to
change occupation are lower. Specifically, conditional upon having worked in a
similar occupation for 7.5 years or more in the most recent 15 years, white collar
workers are classified as disabled if their ability to work has been reduced to less
than 50% relative to that of a healthy person with comparable education in the
same occupational group (Berufsschutz ).
To eliminate legal differences with respect to the self-employed, the Austrian
government relaxed DI eligibility criteria for elderly private sector workers above
55 in 1981. Specifically, elderly applicants are classified as disabled if their ability
5With the pension reform the 1996 numbers have been adjusted slightly to 1.83 percent for
each contribution year below 30 and 1.675 percent for each contribution year above 30.
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to work has been reduced to less than 50% that of a healthy person with com-
parable education in a similar occupation. An occupation is considered similar
if the core requirements are identical: manual and mental demands, amount of
responsibility, posture, concentration, endurance, required care, and stress level
must be comparable (Wörister (1999)).
Thus, as older workers are only compared to the set of workers in their occupa-
tion (Tätigkeitsschutz ), it is substantially easier for them to qualify for benefits.
As an example, consider a server who is unable to carry dishes due to arthritis.
Below the age threshold her disability application will be rejected, given that she
could still work as a cashier, for example. Above the age threshold, however, she
will be awarded a disability pension. As a direct consequence, disability enroll-
ment rises significantly at and above the age threshold. The OECD reckons that
the strong focus on the former occupation is the main explanation for the low
employment rates of around 30 percent for men and women aged 55-64 (OECD
(2005)).
3 The Structural Adjustment Act
With the aim of improving fiscal health and fostering employment among older
workers, the Austrian Pension System underwent significant changes in 1993,
1996, and 2000. While the 1993 and 2000 reforms had little impact on DI eligi-
bility, the reform in 1996 reduced disability enrollment among the elderly sub-
stantially by increasing the age threshold for easy access to DI benefits from 55
to 57.
The 1993 pension reform, which became effective on July 1, introduced a
bonus for retirement after the early retirement age and changed the assessment
basis from the last 15 years of earnings to the highest 15 years of earnings. Given
that wages generally rise with age, the later change had no effect on disability or
retirement pension benefits for most individuals. The 1993 reform also introduced
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a new disability pension: the early retirement pension due to reduced working
capacity, which supposedly made DI benefits more accessible to workers aged 55
and older. However, given that before the reform the conditions for obtaining
disability benefits had already been relaxed for individuals aged 55 and older,
this change made no substantive difference in conditions for eligibility.
In May 1996 the Austrian government enacted the Structural Adjustment
Act (Strukturanpassungsgesetz), which became effective on September 1, 1996.
The primary objective was to cut down on expenditures in the public pension
system, in order to satisfy the criteria for accession to the European Economic
and Monetary Union (see Mairhuber (2003)). Specifically, the reform increased
the number of contribution years required for the early retirement pension from
15 to 20, introduced a penalty for claiming benefits before the early retirement
age and raised the bonus for retirement after the early retirement age. Although
the new penalty for early retirement depended on age, the pension coefficient
did not vary substantially with retirement age and did not represent a significant
change to the pension coefficient before the 1996 reform.
The most important change of all, however, was the two-year increase in the
age, at which conditions for DI benefits are relaxed. Since disability enrollment
is particularly high among older men, this increase only applied to men, while
leaving eligibility conditions for women unaffected. The consequences of this
policy change are seen in Figure 1, which plots the share of newcomers to the
disability rolls by age for men (left panel) and women (right panel) before and
after the policy change. As the Figure shows, in the period January 1994 to
August 1996 disability take-up for men and women peaked at age 55. Following
the 1996 reform, the disability take-up rate for men at age 55 fell by 6 percentage
points and increased by 3 percentage points at age 57. For the other ages as well
as for women there is no significant change in the age distribution of newcomers
to the disability rolls. Given that below age 55 conditions to be eligible for DI
benefits are already relaxed for white collar workers, the reform is likely to have
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Figure 1: New enrolles to the DI program by age and gender
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Notes: This Figure shows the distribution of new enrolles to the DI program by age and gender before (January
1994- August 1996) and after (September 1996-December 1999) the 1996 reform.
a smaller impact for this group. Figure 2 shows the age distribution of new DI
enrollees for blue and white collar workers before and after the implementation
of the 1996 reform. Clearly, for blue collar workers there is a sizeable decline in
disability take-up at age 55 and 56 while white collar workers experience a much
smaller drop.
On May 23, 2000, the European Court of Justice ruled that different DI
eligibility criteria for men and women would violate EU law. Therefore, on July
1, 2000, the Austrian government set the age at which conditions for disability
benefits are relaxed to 57 for both men and women. The 2000 pension reform
also gradually increased the minimum retirement age from 55 to 56.5 for women
and from 60 to 61.5 for men and raised the penalty for early retirement and the
bonus for retirement after the statutory retirement age. Specifically, the pension
12
coefficient used in the disability pension is reduced relative to that of the old-age
pension. The reduction in the disability pension coefficient is based on insurance
years with lower insurance years receiving larger reductions.
Figure 2: New enrolles to the DI program by age for blue and white collar workers
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Notes: This Figure shows the distribution of new enrolles to the DI program by age for blue and white collar
workers before (January 1994- August 1996) and after (September 1996-December 1999) the 1996 reform.
3.1 Possible Labor Supply Effects of the SAA
By tightening eligibility criteria, the 1996 Structural Adjustment Act decreased
the supply of disability benefits for older male workers aged 55 and 56. Using
administrative data from Austria, the goal of this paper is to examine the impact
of this procedural change impact on the labor supply of affected workers. We can
distinguish three different groups: (1) individuals that do not meet the relaxed
conditions for DI benefits, either because of their health status or work history,
(2) individuals that meet the stricter eligibility criteria, and (3) individuals that
qualify for DI benefits under the relaxed eligibility criteria but do not under
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the strict criteria. The policy change has the biggest impact for individuals in
group (3). However, given that the medical screening process is imperfect, even
individuals in group (1) and (2) may change their labor supply behavior.
In addition to the disability insurance program the UI and SI program provide
income replacement in the case of a separation from the labor market for eco-
nomic or health reasons. These programs may influence the individuals’ response
to changes in the DI program. This aspect is particularly relevant in Austria,
given the poor labor market prospects of older workers that are still capable of
working. Wörister (1999), for example, argues that the relaxed eligibility crite-
ria for DI benefits for older workers reduces the unemployment rate for this age
group substantially.
The basic theory of how disability screening affects the labor supply of older
workers is presented in Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) and Autor and Duggan
(2003). Stricter eligibility criteria affect the labor supply behavior of individu-
als by reducing the probability p of being awarded benefits. For an employed
individual a reduction in p decreases the value of applying for disability bene-
fits relative to continuing to work. Hence, there should be less direct exits from
employment to disability because (1) fewer people are awarded benefits and (2)
the number of applicants decreases due to self-screening (see Parsons (1991)).
However, employed workers that are no longer eligible for DI benefits under the
relaxed rules may seek UI or SI benefits instead, thereby reducing the positive
effect on employment. The net effect on employment is thus unclear.
In addition to an increase in the number of employed workers applying for UI
and SI benefits, stricter eligibility criteria are likely to reduce the share of UI or
SI recipients who seek DI benefits. Moreover, affected individuals need to wait
only two years (one year for men aged 56) before they reach the new eligibility
age at which conditions to be classified as disabled are relaxed. Taken together,
we expect to observe an increase in the UI and SI rate after the policy reform
because (1) there are less transitions from these programs into DI and (2) the
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persistence in UI and SI is likely to increase. Finally, as suggested by Figure 2,
the effects of the SAA are expected to be larger for blue collar relative to white
collar workers.
4 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy to evaluate the 1996 policy reform relies on a difference-in-
difference (DD) approach. The first difference is over time, as access to disability
benefits became stricter after 1996. The second difference is across groups; only
men aged 55 and 56 were directly affected by the new disability screening rules.
These individuals define the treated group. The definition of the comparison
group is crucial, as it should capture labor market trends in the absence of the
policy change. There are two alternative control groups that can be used to
estimate the counterfactual effects of the 1996 reform: (1) women aged 55 and 56
and (2) men younger than 55. The empirical analysis will rely on men younger
than 55 as control group.
Group (1) is an inadequate control group for several reasons. First, over the
period under consideration the labor force participation of older women generally
increased. Thus, even in the absence of the policy change, trends in employment
differ by gender. Second, since the early retirement age for women is 55, the labor
supply behavior of older women is affected by changes in the early retirement
rules. Specifically, the 1996 pension reform raised the number contribution years
needed to qualify for early retirement from 15 to 20, thereby restricting access to
early retirement benefits substantially.
People in group (2) are unlikely to change their labor supply behavior as a
consequence of the Structural Adjustment Act. However, there is one concern
when using group (2) as comparison group. Since, for this group, eligibility
criteria for disability benefits are stricter, the inflow into disability is expected
to vary less with the business cycle. Hence, trends in disability enrollment may
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differ compared to the treatment group even in the absence of the policy change.
To shed light on this concern, the difference-in-difference identification strategy
includes pre-treatment interaction terms, which will capture different labor supply
tendencies between the treatment and control group prior to the policy change.
The difference-in-difference comparison is implemented by estimating regres-
sions of the following type:
yit = α + β Ageit + δ(Postt × Ageit) +
∑
j
γjλj + θ xit + εit (2)
where i denotes individual, a age and t time; yiat is the outcome variable of inter-
est; Age is a dummy for treatment group (1 if treatment, 0 if control) to control
for group-specific trends; and Post is a dummy which is 0 before August 1996
and 1 after August 1996. The λj’s are quarter or year fixed effects, depending on
the specification, to control for changes in macroeconomic conditions. The vector
xiat is a set of individual specific characteristics to control for any observable dif-
ferences that might confound the analysis (blue–collar status, experience, number
of contribution months, previous annual earnings, average earnings over the best
15 years, industry and region dummies). The coefficient of interest is δ, which
measures the effect of stricter DI eligibility criteria on the treated group relative
to the comparison group, using variation over time. To explore the impact of
the policy reform over time, equation (2) is generalized by including a full set of
treatment × quarter or year interaction terms:
yit = α + β Ageit +
∑
j
δj(λj × Ageij) +
∑
j
γjλj + θ xit + εit (3)
The coefficients of interest are the deltas. The pre 1996 interaction terms provide
“pretreatment” specification test, although they may capture possible anticipation
effects. Equation (2) and (3) are estimated for men aged 49-50, 51-52, and 53-54
as comparison groups. The identifying assumption is that there are no unobserved
age-group-specific changes that (1) are correlated with the policy change and (2)
are correlated with age-group-specific changes in the outcome variable.
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Several outcome variables are examined. The first set of regressions analyzes
the impact of the policy reform on levels of disability, unemployment, sick leave,
employment, and the residual category (containing those that are not employed,
unemployed, disabled, nor receiving SI). The outcome variable is a dummy, which
is equal to 1 if an individual is the state of interest at time and 0 otherwise. Since
blue and white collar workers generally differ with respect to their eligibility
criteria for DI benefits, effects for these two groups are examined separately. The
second set of regressions studies the impact of the policy change on transitions
between different states, thereby allowing for a more detailed picture of the labor
supply effects triggered by the SAA. Three sets of transitions are analyzed: (1)
from employment to all other states, (2) from unemployment to all other states,
and (3) from the sickness insurance program to all other states. The dependent
variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if an individual switched from state i
to state j – the state under study – and 0 if the individual is still in state i or
switched to some other state k 6= j.
5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data comes from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which con-
tains detailed information on the labor market and earnings history of individuals
back to 1972 as well as some firm-specific information such as region and industry
affiliation.6 The work history is summarized by spells. Specifically, all employ-
ment, unemployment, disability, sick leave and retirement spells are recorded.
Employment spells are bound to individual employers. For example, accepting a
new job in another firm starts a new spell, while a change of occupation within
the same firm does not. At the individual level the data also contains informa-
tion on gender, age, experience, tenure, blue collar or white collar status, and the
number of contribution and insurance years.
6For a detailed description of the data see Zweimüller et al. (2009).
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The main sample consists of all men aged 49-56 over the period 1991 to
2002 (birth cohorts 1930 to 1953) working in Austria. Individuals are observed
on a quarterly basis for approximately 5 1/2 years before the implementation
of the SAA (January 1991 to August 1996) and a period of about 6 1/2 years
(September 1996 to December 2002) when the stricter DI eligibility criteria were
in effect. However, the main focus of the analysis lies on the years 1994 to 1999,
given that both in 1993 and 2000 significant policy reforms became effective,
which potentially had an impact on labor supply.
The sample restrictions are as follows. First, all individuals who spent more
than a year self-employed or as public servants are excluded as they are covered
by a different pension system. In particular, public employees have relaxed eli-
gibility conditions for disability benefits at all ages, which results in a high level
of disability enrollment even at lower ages. Second, in order to isolate the effects
of stricter eligibility criteria, the focus lies on individuals with at least five con-
tribution years, which are likely to satisfy the non-medical eligibility criteria for
disability benefits.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the treatment group and the potential
control groups “men aged 49-50”, “men aged 51-52”, and “men aged 53-54” both
before September 1996 and after September 1996. Except for the number of
contribution years (and therefore disability benefits), there are minor differences
between the different age groups with respect to observable characteristics. A
comparison of the fraction of individuals in the different labor market states
before and after the 1996 reform provides the first evidence on the impact of
the policy change. Specifically, in the treatment group, relative to the control
groups, the rate of disability declines considerably after the SAA became effective.
Paralleling this decline, there is a substantial increase in the unemployment rate.
Similarly, we observe an increase in the sick leave and employment rate, while
the residual category is unchanged.
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Table 1: Treatment and control group characteristics
Ages 49-50 Ages 51-52 Ages 53-54 Ages 55-56
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Disabled 5.63 6.35 7.52 8.20 10.73 10.76 24.05 18.36
(23.04) (24.39) (26.38) (27.44) (30.95) (30.98) (42.74) (38.72)
Unemployed 8.47 9.82 10.16 11.26 12.12 13.14 10.09 14.23
(27.85) (29.76) (30.22) (31.61) (32.64) (33.78) (30.11) (34.93)
Sick leave 1.26 1.24 1.30 1.36 1.46 1.54 1.06 1.62
(11.16) (11.07) (11.33) (11.57) (12.01) (12.33) (10.26) (12.61)
Employed 83.31 81.45 79.21 77.49 73.77 72.65 62.62 63.70
(37.29) (38.87) (40.58) (41.76) (43.99) (44.58) (48.38) (48.09)
Residual 1.33 1.14 1.80 1.69 1.92 1.92 2.18 2.09
(11.45) (10.60) (13.28) (12.90) (13.71) (13.72) (14.60) (14.32)
Blue 59.35 62.33 57.62 60.90 58.82 58.64 61.48 58.79
(49.12) (48.46) (49.42) (48.80) (49.22) (49.25) (48.42) (49.22)
Exp 13.31 13.15 13.25 12.97 13.16 12.82 12.87 12.59
(3.14) (3.33) (3.19) (3.46) (3.17) (3.55) (3.29) (3.62)
Cont. yrs 12.20 13.66 14.00 13.96 15.76 15.48 17.05 17.00
(3.91) (5.82) (4.34) (4.09) (4.63) (4.53) (5.01) (4.89)
Wage 30,150 31,464 30,126 31,300 29,884 31,432 28,831 31,392
(45,082) (69,382) (53,448) (50,772) (68,734) (50,809) (60,311) (69,593)
Wage 15yrs 20,466 20,471 21,017 21,059 21,218 21,609 21,071 21,901
(5,885) (5,899) (6,059) (6,186) (6,103) (6,362) (6,178) (6,428)
Individuals 39,874 38,010 29,160 24,650 31,222 25,931 29,502 29,749
Observations 259,262 298,883 307,287 302,458 331,556 326,023 314,329 371,592
Notes: Before refers to the period January 1994 to August 1996. After denotes the period September 1996 to
December 1999. Blue is 1 for blue collar workers and 0 for white collar workers. Exp. 15yrs denotes experience
in the last 15 years and cont. yrs is the total number of years contributing to the pension system. Wage 15yrs
is the average wage over the best 15 years. Wage and Wage 15yrs are in e1,000.
19
5.1 Graphical analysis
To assess the impact of the change in disability eligibility criteria graphically,
Figure 3 plots labor supply trends in men for the age groups 49-50, 51-52, 53-54,
and 55-56 over time. As shown in the top left subfigure, after the change in
law the fraction of disabled individuals in the age group 55-56 starts to decline
by almost 10 percentage points and stays fairly constant at the new level of 15
percent. Over the same period of time, the fraction of disability beneficiaries in
the other age groups increases only slightly or remains constant.
Figure 3: Effects of the 1996 policy reform by year and age group
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Notes: This Figure shows labor supply trends for men by quarter and age group over the period 1991 to 2002.
The top right subfigure in Figure 3 reports changes in unemployment for the
different groups. The strong seasonal fluctuation in unemployment in Austria
is well-documented and is mainly driven by the construction and tourism sector
(Del Bono and Weber (2008)). In the years following the policy change the
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unemployment rate of the treatment group starts rising by roughly 7 percentage
points reaching a maximum of 16 percent. For the comparison groups, on the
other hand, the unemployment rate increases only slightly. A similar pattern
can be observed for the SI rate (bottom left panel). For the age group 55-56
enrollment into the SI program starts growing by around 2 percentage points
immediately after the reform. Interestingly, there is a drop in the SI rate in the
quarter before the reform, possibly indicating anticipation effects. However, since
the reform was made public only in May of 1996 and enacted in September of the
same year, anticipation effects are expected to have been small. This conjecture
is confirmed by the fact that no major increase in disability can be seen for
the treatment group in the year of the policy change. Finally, the bottom right
panel reports trends in employment for the different age groups. Despite the
large absorption effects by the UI and SI programs, employment in the treatment
group clearly increases after the policy change took effect.
A look at different cohorts provides further evidence on the effects of the in-
crease in the age at which eligibility criteria are relaxed. Figure 4 reports labor
status by age for the birth cohorts 1938 and 1939, which were unaffected by the
reform, and the birth cohorts 1941 and 1942, which were fully affected by the re-
form. The top left panel shows that among the affected birth cohorts significantly
fewer people receive disability benefits at ages 55 and 56. At age 57 disability
enrollment starts to catch up, but remains below the level of the unaffected birth
cohorts. This finding is also reflected in the patterns of unemployment (top right
panel) and SI enrollment (bottom left panel). Both are significantly higher at
ages 55 and 56 for the affected cohorts and drop considerably at age 57. Fi-
nally, as reported in the bottom right subfigure, there is a permanent increase in
employment at age 55 for the affected birth cohorts. Hence, although some in-
dividuals merely postponed their application for disability benefits by two years,
the SAA permanently reduced disability enrollment and increased employment
among men aged 55 and older.
21
Figure 4: Effects of the 1996 Policy reform by age and year-of-birth
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Notes: This Figure shows labor supply trends for men by year-of-birth and age. The vertical lines denote the
eligibility ages, at which conditions for disability benefits are relaxed, before (age 55) and after (age 57) the
SAA became effective.
6 Results
The results are presented in four subsections. The first subsection examines the
effects of the 1996 reform on the level of disability, unemployment, sick leave, em-
ployment, and the residual category. The second subsection separately analyzes
the impact for blue and white collar workers. The third subsection examines bi-
nary transitions from employment, unemployment, and sick leave to other labor
force states. The fourth subsection discusses the effects of the SAA on government
expenditures.
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6.1 Overall Labor Supply Effects
The first main set of results is summarized in table 2, which shows the OLS
estimates of equation (2) for different dependent variables. The time period
analyzed is 1994 to 1999. Columns (1) to (3) indicate that the change in eligibility
criteria for disability benefits led to a marked decline of 5 to 5.7 percentage points,
depending on the comparison group, in the share of disability beneficiaries. As
shown in columns (4) to (6), the direct consequence of the decline in disability
enrollment was an increase in unemployment of 2.3 to 3.1 percentage points.
Similarly, there is a significant increase in the SI rate of around 0.6 percentage
points, after the SAA is implemented (columns (7) to (9) right part). As shown
in columns (10) to (12) of table 2, in spite of the spillover effects to the UI and
the SI program, employment increased by 1.4 to 2.7 percentage points. Finally,
column (1) to (3) in the table 5 in the appendix indicate that the policy change
had no effect on the size of the residual category (containing those that are not
employed, unemployed, disabled, nor receiving SI). This result is not surprising,
given that all individuals in the sample have at least five contribution years and
are therefore likely to qualify for either UI or SI benefits.
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The estimates presented in tables 2 will be biased if the treatment group and
the comparison group have different labor supply tendencies. To shed light on
this concern, Figure 5 plots the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms
(equation (3)) for each of the three control groups over the full sample period
1991–2002. Each dot on the solid line is the coefficient of the interaction between
an indicator variable for quarter and treatment (a 95-percent confidence interval is
plotted by dotted lines). As shown in the top left panel, coefficients for disability
fluctuate around 0 before 1996 and turn significantly negative after 1996. The
estimated decrease is persistent over time and comparable across different control
groups. There is some evidence for an anticipation effect in the second quarter
of 1996. However, since the reform was only announced in May 1996, individuals
had little time to adjust their behavior. That is, to apply for DI benefits before
the change in law became effective.
The top right and bottom left panels indicate that the decline in disability
enrollment led to a large increase in the UI and, to a lesser extent, in the SI rate,
thereby providing evidence that these programs act partly as substitutes for the
DI program. In spite of these absorbtion effects, there is a substantial increase in
employment, as shown in the bottom right panel of figure 5. This result highlights
the role of the disability insurance for early retirement in Austria. Apparently,
a large fraction of older workers seek DI benefits to retire early and not because
they are truly disabled. The small penalty for claiming disability benefits before
the early retirement age further contributed to this trend.
6.2 Blue versus White Collar
Because health eligibility criteria for disability benefits below the age threshold
are more relaxed for white collar workers relative to blue collar workers, it is
instructive to examine labor supply effects for these two groups separately. Table
3 presents estimates of equation (2) for blue and white collar workers separately.
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Figure 5: Overall effects: quarter × treatment interaction terms
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Notes: This Figure shows coefficients of the quarter × treatment interactions in equation (3) for transitions
from sick leave. Dotted lines denote a 95-percent confidence interval.
Column (1) to (3) indicate that the reduction in disability was disproportionately
large among blue collar workers. For this group disability enrollment decreased
in the order of 7.3 to 8.6 percentage points, compared to a decline of 1 to 1.4
percentage points for white collar workers.
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For white collar workers the decline in disability is completely absorbed by
an increase in the inflow into the UI and SI program, but had no effect on em-
ployment nor, as shown in table 5, on the residual category. Although for blue
collar workers there is also a sizeable substitution effect from disability into un-
employment and the sickness insurance program, employment increases by 2.2
to 4.6 percentage points after the reform became effective. As for white collar
workers, there is no effect on the residual category (table 5).
These findings suggest that white collar workers who seek DI benefits do so
because they cannot continue working as a result of either health status or diffi-
culty in finding work. Thus, the whole decline in disability enrollment is absorbed
by the UI or SI program. In contrast, blue collar workers seem to use the DI pro-
gram to some extent as a gateway for early retirement and, as a consequence of
the tightening in eligibility criteria, decided to remain in employment.
6.3 Transitions across Labor Force States
The overall effects discussed in the previous section can of course either be the
results of changes in the inflow into a certain state; or changes in the persistence in
a certain state; or both. To shed light on the importance of these two effects, the
third subsection examines binary transitions from and persistence in employment,
unemployment, and sick leave. Disability is considered an absorbing state, given
that only a small number of disability beneficiaries return to the labor force.
The first set of results is shown in Figure 6, which plots the estimated coef-
ficients on the quarter × treatment interaction terms of equation (3) for tran-
sitions from and persistence in employment for all three comparison groups. A
95-percent confidence interval is plotted with dotted lines. The top left subfigure
suggest that the SAA led to decrease in direct exits from the labor market of
approximately 1 percentage point per quarter. There is evidence for an anticipa-
tion effect, given that the estimated probability of a transition from disability to
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Figure 6: Transitions from employment: quarter × treatment interaction terms
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Notes: This Figure shows coefficients of the quarter × treatment interactions in equation (3) for transitions
from employment. Dotted lines denote a 95-percent confidence interval.
employment is positive and significant just prior to the reform.
As shown in the top right subfigure, there is little evidence that the policy
reform had an effect on the transition rate from employment to unemployment.
On the other hand, employed workers are more likely to seek SI benefits after the
change in the law (bottom left panel). However, this effect is not significantly
different from 0 in most cases. Finally, the bottom right panel suggests that the
persistence in employment increased after the change in law.
The estimated interaction term coefficients for transitions from and persis-
tence in unemployment are summarized in Figure 7. The top left subfigure
suggests a substantial and significant decline in the probability of a transition
from unemployment to disability after the policy reform is in effect, with little
evidence of a preexisting trend. However, as in the case of employment, there
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is an increase in the number of transitions from unemployment to disability just
prior to the reform, suggesting some anticipation behavior.
The drop in the number of transitions from unemployment to disability is
persistent over time and larger in magnitude than the estimated decline for em-
ployment, which is consistent with Autor and Duggan (2003). Using a dynamic
programming model, Autor and Duggan (2003) show that the response to changes
in DI screening stringency is relatively elastic for the unemployed because they
face low opportunity costs of exiting the labor force to seek benefits. By contrast,
direct employment to disability transitions are relatively inelastic.
Figure 7: Transitions from unemployment: quarter× treatment interaction terms
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Notes: This Figure shows coefficients of the quarter × treatment interactions in equation (3) for transitions
from unemployment. Dotted lines denote a 95-percent confidence interval.
The top right subfigure shows after the change in the law the persistence in
unemployment in the affected group increased relative to all comparison groups.
On the other hand, as shown in the bottom panels, the stricter eligibility rules
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for disability benefits had no effect on transitions from the UI to the SI program
or into employment. The drop in the number of transitions from unemployment
to disability and the increased persistence in unemployment highlight the role of
the DI program in reducing measured unemployment.
The last set of results, summarized in Figure 8 explores transitions from sick
leave into other states. The probability of a transition from sick leave to disability
drops after the Structural Adjustment Act becomes effective (top left panel). On
the other hand, as displayed in the bottom left subfigure, there is a sizeable and
of the same magnitude there is a significant increase in the persistence of sick
leave. Lastly, the top and the bottom right panel indicate that the change in law
had no effect on transitions to unemployment or employment.
In net, the findings from the analysis of binary transitions between labor force
states suggest that the decline in disability enrollment documented in table 2 is
the result of a reduction in the inflow rate from employment, unemployment,
and sick leave. As a direct consequence, the persistence in employment increased
providing evidence that the DI program serves, to some extent, as a gateway for
early retirement. That is, some elderly workers may seek DI benefits to retire
early, even if their health status would permit them to continue in the labor force.
However, the SAA also led to an increase in employed workers joining the SI
program, suggesting that some employed workers with adverse health conditions
are denied benefits under the new eligibility criteria. On the other hand, the
observed drop in the number of transitions from unemployment to disability,
combined with an increase in unemployment persistence, indicates that the DI
program may act as unemployment insurance for those that are not disabled but
have poor employment prospects. Thus, the high disability rate among older men
may not only be the result of program incentives, but may also due to the lack
of employment opportunities.
The graphical analysis suggest that the proposed empirical strategy is not
simply picking up long-run trends in differences between the control and treat-
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Figure 8: Transitions from sick leave: quarter × treatment interaction terms
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Notes: This Figure shows coefficients of the quarter × treatment interactions in equation (3) for transitions
from sick leave. Dotted lines denote a 95-percent confidence interval.
ment group. There is evidence that the announcement of the reform triggered
some anticipation behavior, which would cause an upward bias in the estimates.
However, the size of the anticipation effect is small compared to the direct im-
pact of the SAA on labor supply behavior. The comparison group may not be
ideal, because the stricter eligibility conditions for DI benefits for the age group
55-56 might result in the general equilibrium effect of potentially feeding back
to the labor demand for the age group 49-54. Such spillover effects are likely to
be small, given that the labor supply of the control groups displays no change in
trend after the SAA is in effect.
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6.4 Did the Structural Adjustment Act Reduce Govern-
ment Expenditures?
The primary objective of the Structural Adjustment Act (SAA) was to reduced
expenditures in the public pension system, by encouraging the labor force par-
ticipation of older male workers. The reform tightened the eligibility criteria for
disability benefits for older male workers aged 55 and 56; the main channel for
early retirement among elderly men. The results from the empirical analysis pre-
sented in the previous sections suggest that the SAA succeeded only partially in
achieving this goal.
First, the positive effect on employment was eroded by large spillover effects
into the unemployment and sickness insurance programs. Second, even in the
absence of spillover effects, there are still doubts that the SAA would have gener-
ated large employment effects. In particular, a comparison of transitions between
labor force states before and after the reform highlight that the largest inflow to
the disability insurance program comes from the unemployment and sickness in-
surance program, while direct transitions from employment into disability are
relatively small. This finding suggests that the low labor force participation of
older men is at least partly the result of poor employment prospects, not govern-
ment program incentives.
Based on the estimation results, one can calculate the impact of the SAA
on government expenditures (table 4). According to columns (1) to (3) in table
2 the share of male disability recipients in the age group 55-56 decreased by
approximately 5 to 5.7 percentage points after the reform became effective, which
corresponds to a drop of approximately 1,421 to 1,632 disability recipients each
year (first row in table 4). Given that in the period after the reform the average
DI beneficiary receives e308 per week in benefits for a period of 47 weeks per
year, the total reduction in averted pension payments ranges from 18.9 to 23.5
million Euros per year. Moreover, as a result of the increase in employment the
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SAA generated additional tax revenues between 3.5 to 5.8 million Euros per year.
However, the reform led to an increase of 667 to 894 UI recipients depending
on the comparison group and an increase of 143 to 189 SI recipients. Given that
the average UI and SI benefits for men aged 55-56 are roughly e190 per year, these
spillover effects created 3.7 to 5.2 million Euros per year of additional expendi-
tures in the UI program and 0.4 million Euros per year of additional expenditure
in the SI program. Hence, the predicted net reduction in the government budget
deficit per year is between 16.9 to 25.2 million Euros.
Table 4: Cost-benefit Analysis
Disability Employment Unemployment Sickness
∆ Individuals
49-50 1,632 779 667 189
51-52 1,567 547 853 169
53-54 1,421 407 894 143
Benefits/Tax 308 196 175 189
Duration 46.9 43.8 30.4 10
∆ Total (in Mio. Euros) Net effect
49-50 23.5 5.8 3.7 0.4 25.2
51-52 21.9 4.7 5.1 0.4 21.1
53-54 18.9 3.5 5.2 0.3 16.9
Notes: ∆ individuals is calculated based on the estimates in table 2 and the average cohort size of the treatment
group in the period 1997-1999. Weekly benefits are in e and duration is the number of weeks per year spent in
the state of interest.
7 Concluding Remarks
Relying on a large policy change in Austria, this paper has analyzed the impact
of a tightening in DI eligibility rules on the labor supply of older workers. Similar
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to other industrialized countries, the disability insurance program in Austria is
an important channel for early retirement, especially because conditions to be
classified as disabled are substantially relaxed for older workers aged 55 and
above. With the aim of improving the fiscal health of the public pension system,
the Austrian government enacted in 1996 the Structural Adjustment Act (SAA).
The most significant change of this legislation was a two-year increase in the
age, at which eligibility rules for disability benefits are relaxed. Since disability
enrollment is particularly high among older men, this increase only applied to
men.
Relying on a difference-in-difference approach and using data on the universe
of Austrian private sector workers, the empirical analysis suggests that stricter
eligibility rules have a significant impact on disability enrollment. Specifically, the
share of disability recipients in the affected age group decreased by approximately
5.5 percentage points after the reform was implemented. The empirical analysis
also suggests that any change in the disability insurance program may affect
enrollment in other government programs that provide income replacement in
the case of a separation from the labor market for economic or health reasons.
Specifically, the share of individuals receiving unemployment or sick leave benefits
increased by 3.5 percentage points, after the SAA became effective. On the other
hand, the estimates indicate that the policy change had only modest employment
effects; employment increased by roughly 2 percentage points. Hence, accounting
for such spillover effects is potentially important for designing effective policies.
While the supply of public benefits is an important factor in the labor force
participation of older workers, the demand for such benefits depends crucially
on labor–market conditions. An examination of workers’ records prior to the
inflow into the disability insurance highlights that a large fraction is unemployed
before claiming disability benefits. Thus, the modest employment response to
the change in eligibility rules for disability benefits may also be the consequence
of poor labor market prospects for older workers that are still capable of working.
35
Improving the employability of older workers is a main policy priority in the face
of current demographic changes, and further investigation into how to do so is
warranted.
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